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Equality is a fundamental concern of human existence. Expressed in the principle of 
equality before the law it requires that those who come before the law are entitled to be 
treated as being of equal value and to be given ‘equal consideration’. In circumstances 
where those who come before the law are marked by their differences, giving of equal 
consideration requires that difference be understood and taken into account. The 
identification of difference does not of itself determine the question of whether different 
treatment is warranted in the interests of equality. However, this article argues that 
understanding difference is a precondition for the promotion of true equality and that, in 
pursuit of understanding difference, it is necessary for us to acknowledge the limitations 
of our capacity to understand the lived experience of ‘others’ and to actively work to 
engage with these experiences. In the context of the criminal justice system, we offer 
abused women who kill as illustrative of this need, focusing upon the availability and 
operation of self-defence in England/Wales, Queensland and Victoria. In doing so, we 
consider the capacity of the law, legal process and legal actors to engage with the lived 
experiences of these women, highlighting the importance of ‘informed imagining’. 
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I   I N T R O D U C T IO N 
Equality of treatment — understood as treatment of like alike and unlike 
differently — is a central concern of human existence. And, concern for equal 
treatment is founded on the principle of equality itself, which holds that 
despite marked differences and inequalities between people and groups of 
people, an inherent equality as human beings remains. The principle of 
equality as human beings is then often formulated as requiring that all 
persons be treated with ‘equal concern and respect’,1 as being of ‘equal worth’2 
and having equal dignity. It can similarly be formulated as a principle 
requiring that each person’s interests are given equal weight or that ‘all 
 
 1 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, 1978) 273; Ronald 
Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Clarendon Press, 1985) 191. See also Tom Campbell, Justice 
(Macmillan, 1988) 51; Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction 
(Clarendon Press, 1990) 4; Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of 
Equality (Harvard University Press, 2000); Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Belknap 
Press, 2011) 2; John Finnis, ‘Equality and Differences’ (2012) 2(1) Solidarity: The  
Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics (online) 1, 9 <http:// 
scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/1084>, archived at <https://perma.cc/ 
9LC6-2WJB>. 
 2 Campbell (n 1) 51. See also Kymlicka (n 1) 4–5, 44. 
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persons should be given equal consideration’.3 As Sen maintains, ‘it is difficult 
to see how an ethical theory can have general social plausibility without 
extending equal consideration to all at some level’.4 In what follows, the 
expression ‘equal consideration’ will be preferred, but it is taken to be 
reflective of these various formulations. 
In the context of the criminal law, the principle of equality before the law  
is beyond question. But here we are interested in the application of principle 
and with an interrogation of what an equality principle requires for those who 
come before the adversarial criminal justice system. The focus is on the 
experience of battered women who kill and the capacity of the law to engage 
with their experience in the context of a claim of self-defence, where ques-
tions like ‘Why didn’t she just leave?’, ‘Why didn’t she call the police?’, ‘Why 
did she strike when he was asleep (passed out)?’, ‘Why did she use a weapon?’ 
or ‘Why did she make a plan to kill?’, fall to be answered by a jury. Though 
battered women who kill may do so in myriad ways and circumstances, these 
bear little resemblance to the infliction of lethal force by a ‘typically’ male 
killer responding to an immediate attack, made so familiar by the ‘imminent’ 
threat scenarios that grace our television screens night after night. How does 
equality, and the equal application of the law of self-defence, get a foothold 
here in the face of these differences? 
We argue that equality of treatment in this circumstance and others is 
fundamentally about recognising, understanding and responding to differ-
ence. Our argument is that it is not possible to understand the necessity or 
reasonableness of her response without a full consideration of her lived 
experience as a battered woman. And, that the measure of the law’s capacity 
to treat her equally, in considering her claim to self-defence, is the extent to 
which it facilitates and enables particular attention being paid to her experi-
ence and the experience of battered women in general. 
The focus of our analysis is on the substantive law of self-defence and its 
application. This should not be taken as suggesting that other aspects of the 
criminal justice system’s treatment of abused women who kill are immune 
from being measured against an ‘equal consideration’ yardstick.5 The purpose 
 
 3 Campbell (n 1) 33. See also John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative 
Government (JM Dent & Sons, 1910) 58. 
 4 Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined (Harvard University Press, 1992) 3–4 (emphasis in 
original); see also at 18, 130. 
 5 For example, questions could be asked about whether prosecutors have given equal 
consideration to abused women who kill in the exercise of their discretion to prosecute and 
in the plea-bargaining process, or by judges in the exercise of the sentencing discretion once 
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is to demonstrate that an entitlement to equal consideration and an under-
standing of what this requires does in fact operate as a useful evaluative tool. 
Our restriction enables the question to be asked: to what extent has the law of 
self-defence and its reform enabled engagement with the reality of abused 
women? And, to see this question for what it is — an equality question with 
difference at its heart. 
We contend that our intuition provides a necessary but insufficient foun-
dation for engaging with the question of whether a difference will justify or 
require differential treatment. We look therefore at the importance of imagin-
ing ourselves into the shoes of others in moral reasoning, in order to respond 
to difference and the lived experiences of others, together with the limits on 
our capacity to actually do so. 
We develop this argument over three sections. The first section explores 
the concept of ‘equal consideration’. A key aspect of this is an understanding 
of how intuition is both an enabling and a restrictive mechanism. In the 
second section we turn our focus to the problematic of abused women who 
kill. We provide an overview of the law of self-defence in England/Wales, 
Queensland and Victoria, highlighting how the latter has the potential to 
realise ‘equal consideration’. However, even in Victoria, where reform has 
gone furthest, challenges remain. In the final section we argue that recognis-
ing and responding to the lived experiences of abused women necessitates a 
process of ‘informed imagining’. 
By way of restatement, our underlying premise is that the principle of 
equality, and specifically, equality before the law, provides an axiomatic 
foundation from which to consider the treatment of people who come before 
the law. It is a foundation from which to hold criminal law, criminal process 
and ‘criminal justice decision-makers’ to account,6 and a platform to call for 
change. Our purpose then is to provide a foundation for continuing engage-
 
there has been a finding of guilt. We would argue that at each point, equality demands the 
process and the actors within the process to engage with the lived experience of abused 
women if anything like equality is to be approached. 
 6 The phrase ‘criminal justice decision-makers’ is used in Luke McNamara, ‘“Equality  
before the Law” in Polyethnic Societies: The Construction of Normative Criminal Law  
Standards’ (2004) 11(2) Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law (online) [55] 
<www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v11n2/mcnamara112.html>, archived at <https:// 
perma.cc/ZK3U-W2GT>. This category of persons is defined by McNamara to include 
‘police officers, prosecutors, defence lawyers, magistrates, judges and juries’. ‘Criminal justice 
decision-makers’ is used to refer to those whose actions and decisions most clearly impact 
the treatment of those who come before the criminal courts, in particular, judges, magis-
trates, legal practitioners, jurors and, one step back, legislators whose actions result in the law 
and process that shape the operation of criminal law: see at [19]–[20]. 
2018] Equal Consideration and Informed Imagining 1205 
ment in progressive legal scholarship that encourages an approach towards 
what Lacey refers to as ‘an ethical law’.7 
II   L AW,  EQ UA L I T Y  A N D  EQUA L  CO N S I DE R AT IO N 
A  The Principle of Equality before the Law 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognises the ‘inherent dignity 
and … the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family’8 
and proclaims in art 1 that ‘[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in 
dignity and rights’. Such instruments accept as foundational the principle that 
‘[a]ll human beings are by their nature equal’9 leading to another fundamental 
principle: the entitlement to equality before the law in our criminal justice 
system, and our legal system more generally. Equality before the law is 
enshrined in international and domestic law through declarations, conven-
tions, Acts of Parliament and in the common law.10 In Green v The Queen, 
French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ of the High Court of Australia described the 
principle of equality before the law as ‘the starting point of all other liber-
 
 7 Nicola Lacey, Unspeakable Subjects: Feminist Essays in Legal and Social Theory (Hart 
Publishing, 1998) 247–8. 
 8 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, UN Doc A/810 (10 
December 1948) Preamble para 1 (‘UDHR’). 
 9 Finnis, ‘Equality and Differences’ (n 1) 9. See also John Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political, and 
Legal Theory (Oxford University Press, 1998) 170 n 166. The principle has deep roots in 
Western political philosophy spanning far beyond the application of criminal law and crimi-
nal process: see, eg, HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 1961) 151–80; 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, tr WD Ross (Infomotions, 2000) bk 5, 55–6 [3]. 
 10 See, eg, UDHR (n 8); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for 
signature 19 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) art 26. In 
England and Wales, equality before the law is enshrined in Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 4 November 1950, 213 
UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953), as amended by Protocol No 14 to the Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Amending the Control 
System of the Convention, opened for signature 13 May 2004, CETS No 194 (entered into 
force 1 June 2010) art 14. In Australia, see s 8(3) of both the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) 
and the Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic). See also Leeth v Commonwealth 
(1992) 174 CLR 445, 485–6 (Deane and Toohey JJ); AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the 
Law of the Constitution (Macmillan, 10th ed, 1959) 202; Kate Warner, ‘Equality before the 
Law: Racial and Social Background Factors as Sources of Mitigation at Sentencing’ in Julian 
V Roberts (ed), Mitigation and Aggravation at Sentencing (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 
124, 126–43. 
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ties’.11 Indeed, so foundational is the principle that it was described by the 
Privy Council in Matadeen v Pointu as ‘one of the building blocks of democ-
racy’.12 The Privy Council went further to say ‘that treating like cases alike and 
unlike cases differently is a general axiom of rational behaviour’.13 
In this formulation, ‘[j]ustice involves the right to treatment as an equal, 
not the right to equal treatment’.14 This is entirely consistent with the principle 
that like be treated alike because, in the absence of a relevant difference, 
inequality of treatment could not amount to treatment as an equal.15 But 
where relevant differences do exist and laws and legal processes are applied 
equally, without regard for these differences, people are often not treated as 
equals.16 Expressed more forcefully and without qualification, ‘[t]here is no 
greater inequality than the equal treatment of unequals’.17 This is where the 
principle of equality — understood as an entitlement to equal consideration — 
enables us to grapple with the reality of unequal treatment. It requires us to 
look at the effect of the law or legal process and ask: having full regard for the 
differences of and between those coming before the law, is this person being 
treated as less? This is to accept that the ‘equal value’ of human beings may 
require that ‘what is different … be treated differently’.18 
Thus the character of the treatment as same or different does not itself  
determine whether a person is treated as less. The focus must be on the 
interaction between treatment and the differences between the people treated.  
In this investigation, close consideration must be given to the identification  
of ‘relevant differences’ and the nature and effect of these differences.19 As 
Rhode puts it, ‘[t]he crucial issue becomes not difference, but the difference 
difference makes’.20 
 
 11 (2011) 244 CLR 462, 472–3, quoting H Lauterpacht, An International Bill of the Rights of Man 
(Columbia University Press, 1945) 115. 
 12 [1999] 1 AC 98, 109. 
 13 Ibid. 
 14 Campbell (n 1) 51. 
 15 Finnis, ‘Equality and Differences’ (n 1) 9. 
 16 Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2011) 1–4. 
 17 Dennis v United States, 339 US 162, 184 (1950). 
 18 South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v South Africa) (Second Phase) [1966] ICJ Rep 7, 305 
(Judge Tanaka). 
 19 Postiglione v The Queen (1997) 189 CLR 295, 301 (Dawson and Gaudron JJ). ‘Equal justice 
requires that like should be treated alike but that, if there are relevant differences, due allow-
ance should be made for them’ (emphasis added). See also Green (n 11) 472–3 (French CJ, 
Crennan and Kiefel JJ). 
 20 Deborah L Rhode, ‘Feminist Critical Theories’ (1990) 42 Stanford Law Review 617, 625. 
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To take a simple example: it might be thought that all persons within a 
community have an equal opportunity to enter the local courthouse and 
thereby physically access an important institution of justice. The door 
automatically opens if people present themselves before it. Yet, if the door is 
atop a flight of steps and there is no ramp or lift, then it is apparent that there 
is a denial of equal access to justice for a mobility-impaired person restricted 
to a wheelchair. To provide only the same physical opportunity for access in 
this case — entry at the top of a flight of steps — is to treat the mobility 
impaired person as less. The mobility impairment is therefore, in this context, 
a ‘relevant difference’, and equality requires the provision of a ramp or other 
method guaranteeing true equality of access. 
As the above example makes clear, in considering the ‘difference difference 
makes’, from a foundation of equal respect, equal worth and equal dignity, it is 
apparent that an equality question cannot be answered in the abstract.21 It 
must be answered by giving close consideration to the concrete circumstances 
of the person before the law, understood by reference to the lived experiences 
of the intersecting groups to which that person belongs.22 Thus, answering an 
equality question is both a comparative and a contextual exercise. As stated by 
McIntyre J (delivering the reasons of McIntyre and Lamer JJ), in Law Society of 
British Columbia v Andrews, equal justice ‘is a comparative concept, the 
condition of which may only be attained or discerned by comparison with the 
condition of others in the social and political setting in which the ques-
tion arises’.23 
B  Equal Consideration and the Problematic of Systemic Inequality 
Focusing on a specific site within the criminal justice process and asking 
whether one particular group of people who come before the law at this site is 
accorded equal consideration could mean that there is a risk that the bigger 
picture of systemic inequality will be obscured. This is not the intention. In 
the current analysis, understanding the broader social context, including 
 
 21 Ibid. 
 22 See, eg, Kimberle Crenshaw, ‘Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and 
Violence against Women of Color’ (1991) 43 Stanford Law Review 1241; Anne Cossins, 
‘Saints, Sluts and Sexual Assault: Rethinking the Relationship between Sex, Race and Gender’ 
(2003) 12 Social and Legal Studies 77, 91–2, 96; Anna Carline and Patricia Easteal, Shades of 
Grey: Domestic and Sexual Violence against Women (Routledge, 2014) 238–50. 
 23 [1989] 1 SCR 143, 164. 
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social relationships of power, is a prerequisite for understanding the lived 
experiences of others such as abused women who kill. 
Indeed, it remains the case that seeking to promote equality at one site 
within a system is of little value unless that objective is seen as part of a 
broader movement towards a more just system of law and legal process. 
However, we are assuming that something like ‘equality’ can be meaningfully 
approached within the existing criminal justice system, even though the 
system, and society in which that system exists, is shaped by deep and 
enduring social inequalities. 
MacKinnon argues that when it comes to the equality question we are 
missing the point if we do not focus on ‘dominance’ and ‘power and power-
lessness’.24 This has significant implications for the potential to realise equality 
before the law within a system which is founded on an unequal distribution of 
power amongst societal groups and, to a greater or lesser extent, replicates 
this unequal distribution in allocating decision-making positions. Connell 
recognises this in the context of the pursuit of gender equality: 
[T]he very gender inequalities in economic assets, political power, cultural au-
thority and the means of coercion that gender reforms intend to change cur-
rently mean that men (often, specific groups of men) control most of the re-
sources required to implement women’s claims for justice.25 
The point is that the underpinnings of societal institutions are gendered.26 The 
structures of the law are not exempt. For example, the gladiatorial features of 
dispute resolution,27 its language,28 and its definitions of determinative 
concepts such as credibility,29 are a manifestation of gender power. Even the 
concept of equality, based on a liberal account of an autonomous and atom-
 
 24 Catharine A MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (Harvard 
University Press, 1987) 44. 
 25 Raewyn Connell, Confronting Equality: Gender, Knowledge and Global Change (Allen & 
Unwin, 2011) 7. 
 26 See generally RW Connell, Gender and Power: Society, the Person and Sexual Politics (Polity 
Press, 1987); Patricia Easteal, Less than Equal: Women and the Australian Legal System (But-
terworths, 2001) 14; RW Connell, Gender (Polity, 2002). 
 27 Easteal, Less than Equal (n 26) 14, quoting Regina Graycar and Jenny Morgan, The Hidden 
Gender of Law (Federation Press, 1990) 410. 
 28 See, eg, Patricia Easteal, Lorana Bartels and Sally Bradford, ‘Language, Gender and “Reality”: 
Violence Against Women’ (2012) 40 International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 324. 
 29 Jocelynne Scutt, ‘The Incredible Woman: A Recurring Character in Criminal Law’ in Patricia 
Weiser Easteal and Sandra McKillop (eds), Women and the Law: Proceedings of a Conference 
Held 24–26 September 1991 (Australian Institute of Criminology, 1993) 9–20. 
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ised human existence, is ripe for interrogation as arising from a patriarchal 
perspective.30 Achieving full equality, therefore, has to do with transforming 
existing structures,31 and equalising the distribution of social power, encom-
passing the political, economic and judicial spheres.32 
This understanding can lead to disillusion for the reformist, given that ‘all 
law reforms empower law’, thereby empowering a key institution of domina-
tion.33 However, despite the undoubted need for ‘radical transformation of the 
legal and social structure … there is an ethical responsibility to respond to 
those within the present, to try to find ways within the existing system to 
bring about some level of justice, however difficult that may be’.34 This echoes 
Finley’s call for continued engagement with law reform.35 
C  The ‘Less Than’ Question 
Asking the equality question requires giving ‘consideration’ to the lived 
experience of those who come before the criminal justice system as ‘equals’ 
and asking whether they are being treated as less.36 This question is a familiar 
one in feminist thought and scholarship. Indeed, Easteal adopts this question 
 
 30 See, eg, Robin West, ‘Jurisprudence and Gender’ (1988) 55 University of Chicago Law  
Review 1. 
 31 See Angela P Harris, ‘The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction’ (1994) 82 California Law Review 
741, 762. 
 32 See MacKinnon (n 24) 44; Lacey (n 7) 241, asserting that, ‘as marxists saw, the reconstruc-
tion of the legal has to be premised on the reconstruction of economic, social, political rela-
tions: on massive changes in the configuration of social power at every level’: at 248. 
 33 Carol Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law (Routledge, 1989) 161, discussed in Carline and 
Easteal (n 22) 254–5 in relation to ‘[t]he (im)possibility of feminist law reform’. 
 34 Carline and Easteal (n 22) 256. 
 35 Lucinda Finley, ‘Breaking Women’s Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of 
Legal Reasoning’ (1989) 64 Notre Dame Law Review 886. ‘We cannot get away from law, even 
if that is what we would like to do. … [L]aw is such a powerful, authoritative language, one 
that insists that to be heard you try to speak its language … Nor can we abandon caring 
whether the law hears us. Whether or not activists for women look to law as one means for 
pursuing change, the law will still operate on and affect women’s situations. Law will be 
present through direct regulation, through nonintervention when intervention is needed, 
and through helping to keep something invisible when visibility and validation are needed’: 
at 906. 
 36 This point is taken from MacKinnon (n 24) 43, though it is acknowledged that MacKinnon 
was speaking normatively. The original quote is: ‘If sex inequalities are approached as matters 
of imposed status, which are in need of change if a legal mandate of equality means anything 
at all, the question of whether women should be treated unequally means simply whether 
women should be treated as less.’ 
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as both the title and a founding premise for her book Less than Equal.37 She 
begins with her own experience of being ‘placed in certain categories’ and 
being ‘labelled “different” and “less than equal” in a world dominated by a 
masculine way of being and doing’.38 She then proceeds to consider the ways 
in which women are treated as less than equal at various sites in the Australi-
an legal system, exploring how and why this occurs, as well as what can be 
done in response to it. In doing so, Easteal repeatedly asks ‘the woman 
question’. As Bartlett argues: 
In law, asking the woman question means examining how the law fails to take 
into account the experiences and values that seem more typical of women than 
of men, for whatever reason, or how existing legal standards and concepts 
might disadvantage women.39 
This is a ‘less than’ question insofar as the focus is on disadvantages accruing 
to, and failures to take into account the lived experience of, women as 
compared to men. Answering the question requires close consideration be 
given to the lived experiences of women and the laws and processes applied  
to them. 
Furthermore, it is argued that the woman question is a species of equality 
question, which can itself be subject to greater specification to take into 
account the fact that ‘[w]omen are not just women, but also defined in 
relation to race, sexuality, religion, class, disability and so forth’.40 This is to 
recognise the ‘intersectionality’ of human experience,41 where ‘intersectionali-
ty requires a critical reflection upon the myriad of factors which construct 
(but are not determinative of) identity and experience, and how these factors 
interact with law, policy and society’.42 
Indeed, no equality question is necessarily primary,43 such that in some 
contexts and for some people, we may ask how the law fails to take into 
account women’s experience or, for example, the experience of Indigenous 
women, Indigenous female children, Indigenous female children who speak 
 
 37 See Easteal, Less than Equal (n 26) xi. 
 38 Ibid. 
 39 Katharine T Bartlett, ‘Feminist Legal Methods’ (1990) 103 Harvard Law Review 829, 837. 
 40 Margaret Davies, Asking the Law Question (Lawbook, 3rd ed, 2008) 17. See also Drucilla  
Cornell, At the Heart of Freedom: Feminism, Sex and Equality (Princeton University Press, 
1998) 22. 
 41 Crenshaw (n 22). 
 42 Carline and Easteal (n 22) 233. 
 43 Davies (n 40) 257, 260. See also Cossins (n 22) 89–90. 
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an Indigenous language as their first language and so forth.44 Notice that this 
is a process of social categorisation, which is accepted as ‘an indispensable 
part of human thought’ even though ‘attributes such as race, sex, and age lie 
along a continuum, [such that] social labels are never more than approxima-
tions’.45 We must acknowledge too that this may involve a drilling down 
towards subjective experience. But, to be an empirically and politically 
valuable platform for reform, sub-categorisation must end somewhere.46 
We must be able, for example, to ask of the law of self-defence, whether it 
gives equal consideration to the experience of abused women, having regard 
to the empirically understood lived experience of such women as a group, 
even while allowing for differences of experience within this group. Indeed, if 
we ask, ‘Does the law of self-defence give equal consideration to this abused 
woman?’, the question is hardly intelligible without an understanding of the 
dynamics of family violence more generally and the experience of women 
exposed to such violence. Subjective experience, and recognising this subjec-
tive experience, is thus necessarily entwined with group experience. 
Returning to the central point: true equality may only be approached 
through the development of an understanding of what it must really be like to 
be the person before the court — to be an abused woman. Equality therefore 
is fundamentally about recognising difference and giving equal consideration 
to those who come before the law understood by references to these differ-
ences, which are reflective of the intersecting groups to which the person 
belongs.47 This comes very close to a principle of ‘equality as respect for 
 
 44 Cossins refers to the non-‘additive’ study of the intersection and overlap of the socially 
constructed categories of sex and race as ‘convergence analysis’, being an approach that ‘does 
not treat sex and race as different categories’: Cossins (n 22) 96; see also at 91–2. 
 45 Scott Plous, ‘The Psychology of Prejudice, Stereotyping, and Discrimination: An Overview’ 
in Scott Plous (ed), Understanding Prejudice and Discrimination (McGraw-Hill, 2003) 3, 7. 
 46 Sen (n 4) 117–18 reflects on the impracticality of taking full account of diversity in the 
context of discussing distributive equality: ‘It is not unreasonable to think that if we try to 
take note of all the diversities, we might end up in a total mess of empirical confusion. The 
demands of practice indicate discretion and suggest that we disregard some diversities while 
concentrating on the more important ones. That bit of worldly wisdom is not to be scoffed at, 
and indeed, no serious study of inequality that is geared to practical reasoning and action can 
ignore the need to overlook a great deal of our immense range of diversities. The question in 
each context is: What are the significant diversities in this context?’ See also Harris (n 31) 
783–4, citing Regina Austin, ‘“The Black Community”, Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of 
Identification’ (1992) 65 Southern California Law Review 1769, 1775. 
 47 In the broader context of distributive justice, Sen maintains that ‘[t]he pervasive diversity of 
human beings intensifies the need to address the diversity of focus in the assessment of 
equality’: Sen (n 4) 3. See also Cossins (n 22) 98. 
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difference’ as proposed by Bronitt and McSherry,48 drawing upon Lacey’s 
reconstruction of equality in ‘broader pluralistic terms’.49 
Recognising and responding to these differences can be problematic since 
we can only work with what we see. To adopt a metaphor from Easteal, the 
inequality and injustice we see is only the tip of the iceberg with the majority 
of prejudice and discrimination below the surface and not visible.50 
We must acknowledge the limit of our vision and stretch to perceive the 
ice beneath the water. This, in turn, brings attention to our capacity to 
perceive, recognise and understand difference, and the different lived experi-
ences of ‘others’ who come before the criminal courts. Here then, we turn to 
the notion of intuition. 
D  Equal Consideration and the Limited Potential of Intuition 
In attempting to make sense of the application of the principle of equal 
consideration, we must contemplate the limited potential of intuition and 
experience. This is so because the principle of equality, as a principle of 
justice, is rooted in our pre-argument intuition and experience.51 According 
to Aristotle, ‘[i]f, then, the unjust is unequal, just is equal, as all men suppose 
it to be, even apart from argument’.52 
Accordingly, our own experience provides a platform to begin grappling 
with what equality requires. It is a beginning only, because our subjective 
experiences and intuitions, so dependent on our enculturation,53 are also 
great barriers to perceiving inequality and injustice, and judging what is just 
for other people. 
 
 48 Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (Lawbook, 2nd ed, 2005) 
127; see also at 131. 
 49 Ibid 127, citing Lacey (n 7) 239–41, 247–8. Bronitt and McSherry hold that ‘[t]here is 
considerable scope for the “normative reconstruction” of equality in broader pluralistic 
terms such as “equality as acceptance” or “equality as respect for difference”’. Harris main-
tains, in the context of a discussion about critical race theory, that ‘[t]his claim to equality 
based not on sameness but rather on difference is at the heart of the politics of difference’: 
Harris (n 31) 761. 
 50 Patricia Easteal, ‘Setting the Stage: The “Iceberg” Jigsaw Puzzle’ in Patricia Easteal (ed), 
Women and the Law in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2010) 1. 
 51 See Fredman (n 16) 5. 
 52 Aristotle (n 9) 55 [3]. 
 53 The process of enculturation is discussed in detail below. For now it is sufficient to note that 
enculturation is taken here to mean the process by which each of us learns ‘about our cul-
ture’s way of being, seeing, doing and believing’: Easteal, Less than Equal (n 26) 2. 
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Taking the example of siblings born 16 months apart — Jane, and her 
younger brother, Tom — we can begin considering equality of treatment. As 
these siblings grow, they receive benefits and take on responsibilities, or 
burdens, within the family, in education, in the social sphere and later in 
employment. Equality and difference quickly enter the frame. For example, if 
pocket money is given to each, then the 16-month gap may or may not be 
seen as a basis for differential treatment. Almost invariably the younger, Tom, 
will make a claim to strict equality. The same goes for virtually every benefit, 
down to the size of a slice of cake, or the number of blocks of chocolate each 
receives. When it comes to chores, further claims for equality of treatment 
will arise. 
Notably, it is the perceived absence of equality — that is, claims of inequal-
ity — that will often shape the terrain, governed by ‘deeply rooted instinctive 
reactions of resentment which are aroused by “unequal” treatment’.54 Thus, 
equality and justice come to be defined by perceptions of the existence of their 
opposites, inequality and injustice. As Campbell has noted, ‘there is some 
basis for the belief that it is the sense of injustice or grievance that is at the 
core of our ideas about justice and explain its powerful emotive force’.55 
Back to our siblings, equality and difference. Age will invariably be used as 
a justification for differential treatment at various points within the family. A 
most obvious example is the timing of commencement of schooling. Insofar 
as this differential treatment is considered by Jane and Tom to be justified, 
they are likely to accept that they are not being treated unequally in a sense 
that will provoke claims of unfairness. This line will be drawn and redrawn as 
they grow. It will be governed by the norms of their family. 
Similarly, as Jane and Tom engage in public life they will measure their 
experience and the allocation of benefits and burdens against their school 
peers, co-workers and fellow citizens. Claims of equality and inequality will 
remain central in that comparative exercise, as will considerations of differ-
ence, with concepts such as moral desert, effort, merit, achievement and 
position entering the picture as justifications for differential allocation.56 
It is critical to notice here that claims of equality or inequality in these, and 
any other, contexts require the application of a benefit or burden to more than 
 
 54 Campbell (n 1) 25. 
 55 Ibid 1 (emphasis in original). 
 56 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (Blackwell, 1983) 4. 
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one person, such that there is both ‘treatment’ and a ‘comparator’.57 According 
to Fawcett, ‘discrimination and non-discrimination are relational terms, so 
that whether we speak of disadvantage, equality, or advantage, we are speak-
ing of treatment of one person or group as measured by the treatment, or the 
standard of treatment, of another person or group’.58 
In other words, we cannot take one child in a family and ask whether they 
are being treated equally. We need to compare this treatment to that of a 
person who occupies a space that is sufficiently similar to enable claims to  
be made.59 
The more different we may perceive ourselves to be from the person or the 
experience of the person we endeavour to compare our situation to, the more 
difficult it will be to ‘intuitively’ engage with the equality question. Indeed, it 
is worth noting now the problem highlighted by MacKinnon that the deepest 
inequalities may exist where we cannot readily identify a comparator: 
Those who most need equal treatment will be the least similar, socially, to those 
whose situation sets the standard as against which one’s entitlement to be 
equally treated is measured. Doctrinally speaking, the deepest problems of sex 
inequality will not find women ‘similarly situated’.60 
Notwithstanding this, claims of inequality and the intuitive assessment of 
equality by reference to real and notional comparators remain central to  
human existence. 
But, whilst an equality intuition may be foundational, it is unlikely to be a 
sufficient foundation for challenging inequality. Here the question is whether 
an equality intuition provides an adequate ground from which to judge or 
challenge inequality of treatment within the criminal justice system. Two 
problems quickly become apparent. Firstly, if the intuition becomes less useful 
when there are greater differences between the ‘intuitor’ and the comparator, 
 
 57 Sen maintains that ‘[e]quality is judged by comparing some particular aspect of a person 
(such as income, or wealth, or happiness, or liberty, or opportunities, or rights, or need-
fulfilments) with the same aspect of another person’: Sen (n 4) 2. 
 58 JES Fawcett, The Application of the European Convention on Human Rights (Clarendon Press, 
2nd ed, 1987) 299 (citations omitted), quoted in Maloney v The Queen (2013) 252 CLR 168, 
293 [332] (Gageler J). 
 59 Law Society of British Columbia (n 23) 164 (McIntyre J): ‘[equal justice] is a comparative 
concept, the condition of which may only be attained or discerned by comparison with the 
condition of others in the social and political setting in which the question arises’. 
 60 MacKinnon (n 24) 44 (citations omitted). We again note MacKinnon’s counsel that a focus 
on sameness and difference risks obscuring the reality of dominance and power, which 
themselves construct difference. 
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differences become a barrier to understanding. Secondly, and relatedly,  
the formation of the equality intuition is inextricably bound to the formation 
of beliefs that ground differential treatment. These may be justified, or, on  
the other extreme, they may be productive of gross and unjusti-
fied discrimination.61 
Taking the example of the siblings again, Jane may be encouraged by fami-
ly and society to consider herself a ‘girl’ and thereby ‘different’ to Tom, and 
she may be allocated increased burdens because she is a girl. For example, if 
there is a gendered division of labour in the family, it is not unreasonable to 
presume that Jane will, with varying degrees of resistance, participate in that 
division. If her mother does the majority of housework, it may well be that 
Jane is required to do more housework as she grows up than Tom. More 
subtly, she may come to do so, not as a consequence of strict requirement, but 
by adoption of a modeled role.62 Moreover, Jane and Tom may come to accept 
this as fair and equal treatment, justified by the gender difference. The limits 
of intuition and experience as a ground of critique are manifest in both the 
extremes of discrimination and its ever-present reality. 
III   A N  EQ UA L I T Y  QU E S T I O N:  SE L F-DE F E N C E  A N D   
A BU SE D  WOM E N  
In this section, we develop our analysis further by responding to the key 
equality question: ‘Does the law of self-defence give abused women equal 
consideration?’ Here we have a concrete site, a specific law or legal doctrine, a 
defined process, and a specific group of people in mind to which the law is 
applied. The comparator is a man who kills in response to an immediate 
threat of serious violence.63 
The equality issue can be framed as follows: 
Women who kill after being subjected to prolonged family violence have strug-
gled to have their experience and actions accepted as reasonable, and hence 
justified … The questions: ‘Why didn’t she just leave?, ‘Why didn’t she call the 
police?’, ‘Why did she use a weapon?’ or ‘Why did she make a plan to kill?’, no 
 
 61 Fredman (n 16) 1, 5. 
 62 For a real-life example of a teenager whose life has been shaped by sex and gender, used as a 
‘point of departure’ for a broad authoritative discussion of power relations between genders, 
see Connell, Gender and Power (n 26) 1–6. 
 63 Patricia Easteal and Anthony Hopkins, ‘Women and Criminal Law: Defences to Homicide’ 
in Patricia Easteal (ed), Women and the Law in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2010) 
109, 116. 
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doubt, are amongst those that resonate within the jury room or in chambers. 
Almost invariably those deliberating will resort to assessing the reasonableness 
of [a woman’s] actions against their own values and experiences, which are for 
the most part unlikely to accord with those of the woman under judgement.64 
Here the question of ‘reasonableness’ is critical and the extent to which this 
‘objective’ aspect of the test of self-defence can be understood from the 
perspective of the woman under judgment. We turn our focus to the law of 
self-defence in England/Wales, Queensland and Victoria and ask whether 
reforms in those jurisdictions have enabled the giving of equal consideration 
to the experience of abused women who kill. 
A  Abused Women and Equal Consideration: Self-Defence in  
England and Wales 
In England and Wales, self-defence is a common law defence, although its 
requirements have recently been ‘clarified’ by statute.65 On a basic level, the 
defence enables a person to ‘do what is reasonably necessary’ in order to 
protect him/herself.66 It is well established that this embodies a subjective and 
objective test: the defendant must have genuinely believed that there was a 
need to use defensive force,67 but s/he may only use the level of force that is 
considered to be reasonable in those (subjectively conceived) circumstances.68 
It is, however, also well established that force will only be ‘reasonably neces-
sary’ if it is used in response to an ongoing or imminent attack. It has been 
argued that the defence embodies male attitudes and responses to violence, 
and thus fails to respond adequately to the plight of abused women who kill.69 
Concomitantly, it is important to note that ‘there has been no significant case 
law on the availability of self-defence as a defence for battered women’ in 
England and Wales.70 
 
 64 Ibid 117 (citations omitted). 
 65 See Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (UK) s 76. 
 66 Palmer v The Queen [1971] AC 814, 831. 
 67 R v Williams (Gladstone) [1987] 3 All ER 411. 
 68 R v Owino [1996] 2 Cr App R 128. 
 69 Katherine O’Donovan, ‘Defences for Battered Women Who Kill’ (1991) 18 Journal of Law 
and Society 219; Aileen McColgan, ‘In Defence of Battered Women Who Kill’ (1993) 13 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 508; Katherine O’Donovan, ‘Law’s Knowledge: The Judge, the 
Expert, the Battered Woman, and Her Syndrome’ (1993) 20 Journal of Law and Society 427. 
 70 Fiona Leverick, Killing in Self-Defence (Oxford University Press, 2006) 90. 
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1 Self-Defence: Subjective and Objective Tests 
The subjective/objective approach to self-defence was codified by s 76(3) of 
the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (UK): ‘[t]he question whether 
the degree of force used by D was reasonable in the circumstances is to be 
decided by reference to the circumstances as D believed them to be’. Further 
to this, s 76(7) sets out that ‘the following considerations are to be taken  
into account’: 
 (a) that a person acting for a legitimate purpose may not be able to weigh to a 
nicety the exact measure of any necessary action; and 
 (b) that evidence of a person’s having only done what the person honestly and 
instinctively thought was necessary for a legitimate purpose constitutes strong 
evidence that only reasonable action was taken by that person for that purpose. 
Ostensibly, the reference to ‘circumstances as D believed them to be’ should 
permit a wider recognition of the impact of an abusive relationship upon a 
defendant’s subjective assessment of harm. Moreover, provided the belief was 
genuinely held, a defendant is permitted to rely upon a mistaken belief, even 
if that belief was unreasonable. Accordingly, there is scope to argue that an 
abused woman genuinely believed that her life was in peril, even if an outsider 
may have perceived the circumstances as non-life threatening. It is, neverthe-
less, important to note that s 76(4)(a) states that ‘the reasonableness or 
otherwise of that belief is relevant to the question whether D genuinely held 
it’. While a belief need not be reasonable, the fact that it was unreasonable 
may be evidence that it was not genuinely held. As such, it has been suggested 
that ‘the fact that a battered woman has been assaulted on many occasions in 
the past but has not been killed might suggest that she is unlikely to be killed 
by her partner in the future’.71 Hence, the prosecution may argue that the fact 
that the victim had not previously utilised violence of a potentially fatal level 
suggests that the defendant’s belief was not genuine. This, however, fails to 
acknowledge that domestic violence frequently escalates in severity over time. 
Indeed, a woman’s experience of violence renders her acutely aware of any 
changes in the abuser’s behaviour which may indicate that the next beating 
may be potentially fatal. As the statistics reveal, many female homicide 
victims suffered years of abuse at the hands of their killer.72 
 
 71 Ibid 91 (emphasis in original). 
 72 R Emerson Dobash et al, ‘Not an Ordinary Killer — Just an Ordinary Guy: When Men 
Murder an Intimate Woman Partner’ (2004) 10 Violence against Women 577, 582. 
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A further factor to consider is the relevance of psychiatric disorders, such 
as post-traumatic stress disorder (‘PTSD’). As noted in Smith and Hogan’s 
Criminal Law, ‘evidence of D’s personal characteristics must, in principle, be 
admissible in so far as they bear upon his ability to be aware of, or to perceive, 
the circumstances’.73 This may allow the defence to adduce expert evidence in 
order to explain why a defendant may have genuinely believed that her life 
was at risk and subsequently why the use of fatal force was not unreasonable. 
However, the law has long excluded reliance upon (voluntarily induced) 
drunken mistakes and, following the cases of R v Martin74 and R v Oye,75 it 
appears that a similar approach has been adopted in relation to psychiatric 
disorders. Thus, in Martin, Lord Woolf CJ stated that the psychiatric condi-
tions would not be relevant ‘except in exceptional circumstances which would 
make the evidence especially probative’.76 Accordingly, it seems unlikely that 
self-defence would succeed if it was perceived that the defendant was mistak-
en as to the reality of the threat, and this mistake was attributable to a 
psychiatric disorder, such as PTSD. Hence, although a jury may take into 
account the size and strength of a woman who kills her abusive partner, the 
history of domestic violence and potentially the psychological effect of the 
abuse, it is questionable whether expert evidence regarding the impact of a 
diagnosed psychiatric condition would be admissible. Undoubtedly, the 
medicalisation of the abused woman and her self-defensive actions is highly 
problematical; nevertheless, the exclusion of psychiatric evidence arguably 
limits the law’s ability to recognise and respond to the lived experiences of 
abused women. 
2 Householders and Conceptualising Reasonable Force 
Prior to 2013, it was well established that if the defendant’s force was dispro-
portionate, the objective limb would not be satisfied.77 Following the case of 
Martin, however, a momentum for reform developed which ultimately 
resulted in the enactment of s 43 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 (UK).78 In 
 
 73 David Ormerod, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 13th ed,  
2011) 382. 
 74 [2003] QB 1. 
 75 [2014] 1 WLR 3354. 
 76 Martin (n 74) 16 [67]. 
 77 Owino (n 68). 
 78 See Explanatory Notes, Crime and Courts Act 2013 (UK) 11 [57]; Sally Lipscombe, 
‘Householders and the Criminal Law of Self Defence’ (Standard Note SN/HA/2959, House of 
Commons, 10 January 2013). 
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that case, Tony Martin killed a 16-year-old boy by shooting him in the back 
during an alleged burglary. Martin claimed that, as he had been burgled a 
number of times previously, he believed his house was particularly vulnerable 
to invasion. Martin also argued that his psychiatric illness affected his 
perception of the risk posed by the burglars.79 The Court of Appeal rejected 
his arguments in relation to self-defence.80 Subsequently, his murder convic-
tion was quashed and replaced with a conviction of manslaughter by reason of 
diminished responsibility.81 
During the report stage of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 
(UK), the government introduced section 76, in order to ensure that if a 
person acted instinctively, reasonably and ‘in good faith’ in response to a 
burglary, the law would ‘clearly be on their side’.82 Despite challenges by 
numerous Conservative MPs,83 the resulting section maintained the common 
law position: thus disproportionate force amounted to unreasonable force.84 
However, the situation arose again for consideration during the passage of the 
Crime and Courts Act 2013 (UK). Consequently, s 76 was amended to include 
the following: ‘In a householder case, the degree of force used by D is not to 
be regarded as having been reasonable in the circumstances as D believed 
them to be if it was grossly disproportionate in those circumstances.’85 
Accordingly, in a householder case, grossly disproportionate force would be 
unreasonable, but all other circumstances, disproportionate force would be 
classified as unreasonable.86 
 
 79 The foregoing summary of fact is adapted from Martin (n 74) 3–5 [10]–[18]. 
 80 See ibid 16–18 [67]–[74]. 
 81 Ibid 18–19 [74]–[82]. 
 82 United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 9 January 2008, vol 470,  
col 347 (Jack Straw, Secretary of State for Justice and Lord Chancellor). 
 83 Ibid cols 346–62. 
 84 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (UK) s 76(6), as enacted. 
 85 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (UK) s 76(5A), as inserted by Crime and Courts 
Act 2013 (UK) s 43(2); Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (UK) s 76(6), as amended 
by Crime and Courts Act 2013 (UK) s 43(3). 
 86 A somewhat similar provision was introduced in South Australia in 2003 by the Criminal 
Law Consolidation (Self Defence) Amendment Act 2003 (SA). The enacted provision, s 15C of 
the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), provides that where certain conditions are 
proved by an accused person on the balance of probabilities, there is no requirement that 
defensive force used in the context of a home invasion be ‘reasonably proportionate to the 
perceived threat’. Many of the criticisms levelled here in relation to the reform in England 
and Wales can similarly be levelled at the South Australian reform. 
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This provision has faced significant criticism.87 It is noteworthy that during 
the course of the parliamentary debates the plight of women who kill their 
abusive partners was not mentioned. Similarly, during the homicide reform 
process, self-defence was not seriously considered as a potential defence for 
abused women. It is argued that this represents a distinct failure to recognise 
and respond to the lived experiences of abused women. This is particularly so 
given the development of the partial defence of loss of control, which replaced 
provocation. The Law Commission noted: 
If person, confronted with violence or threatened violence to himself or herself 
or another, responds with force and does no more than he or she believes to be 
necessary in the circumstances, it is harsh that he or she should be convicted of 
murder and sentenced to life imprisonment because on an objective view the 
degree of force used is judged to have been excessive.88 
Accordingly, if an abused woman kills her violent partner using dispropor-
tionate force due to a loss of self-control triggered by a fear of serious vio-
lence89 she may be guilty of manslaughter, as opposed to murder, if the  
jury accept that a person in her circumstances might have reacted in a  
similar manner.90 
Given that a victim of burglary, however, can plead self-defence if the force 
used was excessive (provided it is not grossly so) this demonstrates a signifi-
cant double standard. Indeed, the failure of the law to provide equal consider-
ation is even more striking when one explores the main arguments presented 
in support of the reform. Lord McNally introduced the reforms by noting that 
 
 87 See, eg, United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 10 December 2012,  
vol 741, col 885, where Lord Woolf, who presided over the Tony Martin case, stated: ‘I op-
pose this amendment because I regard it as a very bad example of where statutory interfer-
ence with the common law is wholly unnecessary’. See also Nicola Wake, ‘Battered Women, 
Startled Householders and Psychological Self-Defence: Anglo-Australian Perspectives’ 
(2013) 77 Journal of Criminal Law 433; Lydia Bleasdale-Hill, ‘“Our Home Is Our Haven and 
Refuge — A Place Where We Have Every Right to Feel Safe”: Justifying the Use of up to 
“Grossly Disproportionate Force” in a Place of Residence’ [2015] 6 Criminal Law Review 407. 
 88 Law Commission, ‘Partial Defences to Murder’ (Consultation Paper No 173, 2003)  
14–15 [1.61]. 
 89 Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (UK) s 55(3). 
 90 For a critical analysis of this defence, see Susan SM Edwards, ‘Anger and Fear as Justifiable 
Preludes for Loss of Self-Control’ (2010) 74 Journal of Criminal Law 223; Barry Mitchell, 
‘Loss of Control under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009: Oh No!’ in Alan Reed and Michael 
Bohlander (eds), Loss of Control and Diminished Responsibility: Domestic, Comparative and 
International Perspectives (Ashgate, 2011) 39; Wake (n 87). 
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‘attacks by intruders in the home cause the greatest public concern’.91 Signifi-
cant emphasis was placed on the victim status of the defendant and the need 
to protect innocent individuals from acts of violence. For example, Sir Alan 
Beith argued that ‘[s]omeone who has been attacked in a terrifying way — 
whose house has been frighteningly invaded — deserves to be treated as a 
victim of a crime’.92 Correlating to these perspectives, the right to feel safe in 
one’s home was stressed. Damian Green, for example, asserted that ‘[a] home 
is supposed to be a haven, a refuge, a place where people have every right  
to feel safe, and that is why we believe that householders deserve  
special protection’.93 
These statements apply equally to abused women. There seems to be little 
justification for allowing a householder to use disproportionate force in the 
case of a burglary, but not when trapped within an abusive relationship. 
Further, it can be argued that gender dimensions underpin the development 
of the law, particularly given the use of the refrain ‘an Englishman’s home is 
still his castle’ in order to support reforms.94 
3 Imminency and Reasonably Necessary Force 
The experience of the abused woman is further excluded by the requirement 
that, in order to be ‘reasonably necessary’, the force must be in response to an 
ongoing or imminent threat of violence.95 Whilst the law permits pre-emptive 
strikes,96 a homicide will not be justified if it is committed in response to a 
threat of some distant future harm, nor if it is committed after the attack has 
occurred.97 Accordingly, if an abused woman kills in a non-confrontational 
situation, she will be precluded from pleading self-defence, despite the fact 
that she may have genuinely believed that her life was in peril. In contrast, 
case law in other jurisdictions and commentators have adopted a hostage 
 
 91 United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 10 December 2012,  
vol 741, col 881. 
 92 United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 14 January 2013,  
vol 556, col 662. 
 93 Ibid col 705. 
 94 Ibid col 669 (Shailesh Vara). 
 95 Beckford v The Queen [1988] AC 130. 
 96 Ibid 144 (Lord Griffiths): ‘a man about to be attacked does not have to wait for his assailant 
to strike the first blow or fire the first shot; circumstances may justify a pre-emptive strike’. 
 97 R v Clegg [1995] 1 AC 482. 
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analogy as a means of widening the timeframe of a pre-emptive strike.98 This 
analogy highlights that the law would be unlikely to require a person held 
hostage, who knows or fears that s/he will be killed or seriously injured in the 
next few days, to wait until the threat is carried out. Rather, the law would 
permit him/her to use a pre-emptive strike against his/her captors. Hence, it 
has been argued that the situation of an abused women is similar to that of a 
hostage, and that to require her to wait until she is being attacked is to 
sentence her to murder by instalment.99 
Nevertheless, during the homicide law reform process, the Law Commis-
sion rejected the hostage analogy on the basis that, unlike an abused woman, 
a hostage is held captive against their will and has no ‘access to outside 
help’.100 This view, though, is based upon problematic assumptions regarding 
domestic abuse. It fails to acknowledge the emotional, physical and financial 
difficulties an abused person could face when asking for help and also 
assumes that any protection sought will be available and effective.101 Unfortu-
nately, the failure of the law and society to protect women from their abusive 
partners is well documented, not in the least through numerous Independent 
Police Complaints Commission (‘IPCC’) reports.102 Statistics also indicate 
 
 98 See, eg, R v Lavallee [1990] 1 SCR 852, 889; Patricia Weiser Easteal, Killing the Beloved: 
Homicide between Adult Sexual Intimates (Australian Institute of Criminology, 1993) 136; 
McColgan (n 69) 519. 
 99 Lavallee (n 98) 889. 
 100 Law Commission, ‘Partial Defences to Murder’ (n 88) 205 [10.99]. 
 101 See, eg, Scutt (n 29); Michelle Fugate et al, ‘Barriers to Domestic Violence Help Seeking: 
Implications for Intervention’ (2005) 11 Violence against Women 290; Jan Bostock, Maureen 
Plumpton and Rebekah Pratt, ‘Domestic Violence against Women: Understanding Social 
Processes and Women’s Experiences’ (2009) 19 Journal of Community and Applied Social 
Psychology 95; Carline and Easteal (n 22). 
 102 See, eg, IPCC, IPCC Independent Investigation: Greater Manchester Police Contact with Clare 
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webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20101224054721/http://www.ipcc.gov.uk/clare_wood_ 
report_final_10_march.pdf>; IPCC, Learning the Lessons: Gender and Domestic Abuse (Bul-
letin No 11, October 2010) <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20170914113020/ 
http://www.ipcc.gov.uk/reports/learning-the-lessons/bulletin-11-gender-and-domestic-
abuse-october-2010>; IPCC, Maria Stubbings (Deceased): Investigation concerning the Actions 
of Essex Police in 2008 (Independent Investigation Final Report, 30 January 2013) 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20131010135825/https://www.ipcc.gov.uk/sites/ 
default/files/Documents/investigation_commissioner_reports/Maria%20Stubbings%20-
%20Final%20Report%20for%20Publication_1.pdf>; IPCC, Becky McPhee: Investigation into 
the Contact between Merseyside Police and Becky McPhee prior to Her Murder on 5 January 
2012 (Independent Investigation Final Report, IPCC Reference 2012/000362, 23 January 
2014) <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20141004144927/http://www.ipcc.gov.uk/ 
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that attempts to leave an abusive relationship and/or obtain help can escalate 
the abuse, sometimes to fatal levels. Indeed, a Metropolitan Police analysis of 
domestic homicide case reviews indicated that in 76% of the cases the victims 
were killed in circumstances involving termination of the abusive relation-
ship.103 Conversely, the fact of previously attempting to access help may, 
paradoxically, further restrict access to justice. It may erroneously be taken to 
suggest that potential viable avenues of escape existed, and accordingly that 
the use of defensive force was not ‘reasonably necessary’. 
Overall, it is argued that the law in England and Wales does little to facili-
tate the presentation of evidence at trial designed to illuminate the experience 
of battered women who kill. It is this contextual evidence that promotes full 
consideration of the circumstances in which a victim of abuse finds herself, 
thereby enabling jurors to consider both the genuineness and reasonableness 
of her use of fatal force. This sits in stark contrast with law reform which has 
lowered the reasonableness/proportionality threshold for those who kill in 
circumstances where their home is being invaded. 
B  Self-Defence in Australia: Queensland and Victoria 
In Australia, the common law formulation of the test of self-defence is set out 
in Zecevic v DPP (Vic).104 Whilst it no longer applies in Victoria or Queens-
land, having been overtaken by statutory formulations, this provides a 
reference against which reform can be measured. Zecevic requires that the 
accused person have a belief based on reasonable grounds that it was neces-
sary to do what he or she did.105 Akin to the test applied in England and 
Wales, this test has both subjective and objective aspects. And, as it is there, 




 103 Metropolitan Police, Findings from the Multi-Agency Domestic Violence Murder Reviews  
in London (Report, 26 August 2003) 17, 31 <http://paladinservice.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2013/07/Findings-from-the-Domestic-Homicide-Reviews.pdf>, archived at 
<https://perma.cc/6947-QV49>. 
 104 (1987) 162 CLR 645, 661 (Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ). 
 105 Ibid; Anthony Hopkins and Patricia Easteal, ‘Walking in Her Shoes: Abused Women Who 
Kill in Victoria, Queensland and Western Australia’ (2010) 35 Alternative Law Journal 132, 
134. See also Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 9AE, inserted by Crimes (Homicide) Act 2005 (Vic) s 6, 
then repealed by Crimes Amendment (Abolition of Defensive Homicide) Act 2014 (Vic) s 3(3). 
Having regard to the burden of proof, once self-defence is sufficiently raised on the evidence 
in a trial, it is for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused did not 
hold the belief, or that there were no reasonable grounds for it. 
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stood as contingent upon subjective perception. This was explained by the 
Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Hendy: 
The question whether the belief was (proved not to have been) based on rea-
sonable grounds is to be determined not by what a reasonable person would 
have believed but by what the accused person might reasonably have believed 
in all of the circumstances in which he [or she] found himself [or herself].106 
This common law formulation is no longer constrained by any legal require-
ment that the threat be ‘imminent’ or that the response to the threat be 
‘proportionate’, though each of these will be considerations that bear upon the 
assessment of the existence and reasonableness of the belief.107 Moreover, the 
common law permits the admission of evidence going to an abused woman’s 
full situational and psychological predicament as relevant to the resolution of 
each issue.108 This acknowledges that her actions can only be judged with a 
full appreciation of the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ that she faced.109 
1 Self-Defence and Law Reform in Queensland 
In Queensland, the defence of self-defence is contained in ss 271–2 of the 
Criminal Code 1899 (Qld). Section 272 applies in circumstances where the 
accused has provoked the assault that they defend against and will be disre-
garded here. Section 271(2) applies where the defensive force used is ‘such as 
is likely, to cause death or grievous bodily harm’.110 It provides that 
[i]f the nature of the assault is such as to cause reasonable apprehension of 
death or grievous bodily harm, and the person using force by way of defence 
believes, on reasonable grounds, that the person can not otherwise preserve the 
person defended from death or grievous bodily harm, it is lawful for the person 
to use any such force to the assailant as is necessary for defence, even though 
such force may cause death or grievous bodily harm. 
Queensland is the last remaining jurisdiction in Australia to require an 
‘assault’ as a precondition to the availability of self-defence. Whilst the 
existence of an ‘assault’ is a precondition of the defence, the Queensland 
Court of Appeal has held that it is an error to think that self-defence is 
 
 106 (2008) 191 A Crim R 81, 87. 
 107 Zecevic (n 104) 662; Osland v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 316, 381–2 [172]–[173] (Kirby J). 
 108 Osland (n 107) 337–8 [56]–[58] (Gaudron and Gummow JJ), 376–8 [167]–[169] (Kirby J). 
 109 Ibid 375 [164] (Kirby J). 
 110 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 271(1). 
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‘available only in response to an immediate physical threat to the person’.111 
Instead, McPherson JA has ruled, with McMurdo P and Dutney J agreeing, 
that the question posed by s 272(2) is in substance the same as the common 
law, being whether ‘the particular accused believed on reasonable grounds 
that there was no other way to preserve himself [or herself] from death or 
grievous bodily harm than resorting to conduct giving rise to the charge’.112 
Consistent with the common law, evidence going to the situational and 
psychological predicament of an abused woman is relevant to answering the 
question of whether the belief was genuinely held, and as to whether there 
were reasonable grounds for the belief that it was necessary to do what she 
did.113 That the history of a domestic relationship is relevant to self-defence is 
reinforced, but not elaborated on, by Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 132B(2), 
which provides that ‘[r]elevant evidence of the history of the domestic 
relationship between the defendant and the person against whom the offence 
was committed is admissible in evidence in the proceeding’. 
Notwithstanding this, law reform in Queensland has proceeded on the 
basis that ‘it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to apply the defence of 
self-defence to a woman who kills her sleeping abuser’.114 It has been convinc-
ingly argued that the requirement for a ‘precipitating assault’ continues to 
operate to exclude the experience of abused women who kill in non-
confrontational circumstances,115 given the abuser must be found to have had 
the ‘actual[] or apparent[] present ability’ to carry out the threat.116 This can 
be understood as a claim that the law of self-defence in Queensland as set out 
in s 271 continues to exclude the lived experience of these women, a denial of 
equal consideration. 
 
 111 R v MacKenzie (2000) 113 A Crim R 534, 547–8 (McPherson JA, McMurdo P and Dutney J 
agreeing). At common law an assault can be constituted by a threat of harm that is not im-
mediate, provided the threat is continuing: see Zanker v Vartzokas (1988) 34 A Crim R 11, 16 
(White J), though there it was found that there was a ‘present fear of relatively immediate 
imminent violence’. 
 112 MacKenzie (n 111) 547 [46]–[47], quoting Osland (n 107) 378 [169] (Kirby J). 
 113 MacKenzie (n 111) 547–8 [47]–[48]. In relation to the mixed subjective/objective nature of 
the ‘reasonable grounds’ formulation, see also R v Vidler (2000) 110 A Crim R 77, 82 [26];  
R v Wilmot (2006) 165 A Crim R 14, 16–17 [4]–[5], 25–6 [38]–[41]. 
 114 Queensland Law Reform Commission, A Review of the Excuse of Accident and the Defence of 
Provocation (Report No 64, September 2008) 313 [15.94]. 
 115 Michelle Edgely and Elena Marchetti, ‘Women Who Kill Their Abusers: How Queensland’s 
New Abusive Domestic Relationships Defence Continues to Ignore Reality’ (2011) 13(2) 
Flinders Law Journal 125, 137–8. 
 116 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 245. 
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In 2010, the law reform process resulted in the enactment of s 304B of the 
Criminal Code 1899 (Qld),117 focused specifically on the circumstances of 
abused persons. The provision provides a partial defence to murder, reducing 
murder to manslaughter in circumstances where 
 (a) the deceased has committed acts of serious domestic violence against the 
person in the course of an abusive domestic relationship; and 
 (b) the person believes that it is necessary for the person’s preservation from death 
or grievous bodily harm to do the act or make the omission that causes the 
death; and 
 (c) the person has reasonable grounds for the belief having regard to the abusive 
domestic relationship and all the circumstances of the case.118 
Notably, assault is not a precondition of the defence, removing the legal 
barrier of imminence, though not its consideration as a matter of practicali-
ty.119 The equality problem is revealed by the conjunction of the three 
requirements articulated in the provision. The latter two — that the accused 
believed on reasonable grounds that it was necessary to do what s/he did — 
are relevantly identical to the common law formulation of self-defence. But, at 
common law, this provides a complete defence. Here it is a partial defence 
directed explicitly, by virtue of the first condition (a), to those who kill their 
abuser. Killing in these circumstances is not therefore justified, as it would be 
at common law or indeed under like interstate statutory formulations. 
Instead, it is only partially excused, resulting in a finding of manslaughter and 
the avoidance of a mandatory life sentence.120 
The specific direction contained in (c) for the fact finder to have ‘regard to 
the abusive domestic relationship and all the circumstances of the case’ whilst 
laudable, in so far as it clearly establishes a legislative intent to require the jury 
to engage with lived experience, does little more than restate the law devel-
oped by courts in the application of s 271(2) as discussed above. The real 
 
 117 Section 304B of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) commenced on 16 February 2010. The law 
reform process is discussed in more detail in Edgely and Marchetti (n 115). 
 118 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 304B(1) (emphasis added). 
 119 Edgely and Marchetti rightly identify the absence of assault as the only substantive element 
that distinguishes s 304B from s 271(2): Edgely and Marchetti (n 115) 139–40. 
 120 See Hopkins and Easteal (n 105) 136, noting that it appears that the introduction of the 
section was in effect a political compromise to avoid the consequences of a murder convic-
tion and a mandatory life sentence. A mandatory sentence is itself a denial of equality, being 
a statutory prohibition on considering the individual circumstance of the offence and the 
offender as they bear upon the purposes of punishment. 
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equality issue is that this legislative direction applies to the partial defence 
only, suggesting that the complete defence of self-defence requires some lesser 
engagement with lived experience than is required under s 304B. Where an 
abused woman seeks an acquittal, rather than a verdict of manslaughter, the 
reform does nothing to ensure that the reasonableness of her actions are 
assessed by reference to all of the situational and psychological circumstances 
in which she finds herself. Nor, where acquittal is sought, does it remove the 
barrier of imminence which is an incident of the continued requirement of a 
precipitating assault, continuing to enshrine a one-off physical attack model 
of self-defence. 
2 Self-Defence and Law Reform in Victoria 
Victoria is an example of a jurisdiction that has gone further in promoting the 
realisation of equality of consideration. The test for self-defence, which 
previously mirrored the common law, has been amended to focus not on the 
existence of reasonable grounds for the belief, but on whether the ‘conduct 
was a reasonable response in the circumstances as the person perceives 
them’.121 Under s 322M(1)(a) the threatened harm does not have to be 
immediate and under s 322M(1)(b) the response does not have to be propor-
tionate to the use of force that one is responding to. This is more inclusionary 
than the law reforms in England and Wales, which permit disproportionate 
force to be used only in householder cases. 
Further, ss 322J and 322M of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic)122 direct attention 
to the reality of the experience of abused women. Section 322M provides  
as follows: 
 (2) Without limiting the evidence that may be adduced, in circumstances where 
self defence in the context of family violence is in issue, evidence of family vio-
lence may be relevant in determining whether —  
 (a) a person has carried out conduct while believing it to be necessary in 
self defence; or  
 (b) the conduct is a reasonable response in the circumstances as a person 
perceives them.123 
 
 121 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 322K, inserted by Crimes Amendment (Abolition of Defensive 
Homicide) Act 2014 (Vic), which commenced on 1 November 2014. 
 122 Inserted by Crimes Amendment (Abolition of Defensive Homicide) Act 2014 (Vic), which 
commenced on 1 November 2014. This legislation is discussed further in the next section. 
 123 Emphasis added. 
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Section 322J(1) sets out an inclusive definition of ‘evidence of family violence’, 
as follows: 
 (a) the history of the relationship between the person and a family member, 
including violence by the family member towards the person or by the person 
towards the family member or by the family member or the person in relation 
to any other family member; 
 (b) the cumulative effect, including psychological effect, on the person or a family 
member of that violence; 
 (c) social, cultural or economic factors that impact on the person or a family 
member who has been affected by family violence; 
 (d) the general nature and dynamics of relationships affected by family violence, 
including the possible consequences of separation from the abuser; 
 (e) the psychological effect of violence on people who are or have been in a 
relationship affected by family violence; 
 (f ) social or economic factors that impact on people who are or have been in a 
relationship affected by family violence. 
The Jury Directions Act,124 was also amended in 2014 to provide for directions 
to be given to the jury in criminal proceedings where self-defence or duress in 
the context of family violence is in issue. In such situations, the trial judge 
must give the jury preliminary directions on family violence (as defined in  
s 322J(2) of the Crimes Act)125 if the defence requests such directions, ‘unless 
there are good reasons for not doing so’.126 Furthermore, the trial judge must, 
if requested by the defence, direct the jury that family violence is not limited 
to physical abuse, and also discuss the nature of reactions to family vio-
lence.127 These directions may assist juries in further understanding the reality 
of family violence, its relevance in determining whether a person believed 
 
 124 Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) re-enacts Jury Directions Act 2013 (Vic) with amendments: see 
Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) s 1(g); Greg Byrne, ‘Simplifying Homicide Laws for Complex 
Situations’ in Kate Fitz-Gibbon and Arie Freiberg (eds), Homicide Law Reform in Victoria: 
Retrospect and Prospects (Federation Press, 2015) 144, 146. 
 125 Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) s 57. 
 126 Ibid s 58(2). It has been suggested that the failure to make such directions mandatory in 
relevant cases represents a missed opportunity: Nicola Wake, ‘“His Home Is His Castle. And 
Mine Is a Cage”: A New Partial Defence For Primary Victims Who Kill’ (2015) 66 Northern 
Ireland Legal Quarterly 151, 163. 
 127 Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) s 60. 
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their conduct was necessary in self-defence and whether the conduct was a 
reasonable response to the circumstances as the person perceived them. 
In combination, these reforms direct attention to the reality of the experi-
ence of abused women. Though the legal test of self-defence is the same for all 
accused persons, focus is given to what will need to be taken into account in 
the interests of achieving equality of consideration in circumstances of family 
violence. This does not by itself achieve equality of consideration, but it does 
further enable its realisation by in effect legislating a direction to give particu-
lar attention to the experience of those who kill their abuser. By itself, this is 
not enough. The legislative provisions can do no more than facilitate the 
admission of evidence to assist judge and jury to understand the lived 
experience of abused women who kill. Moreover, unless such evidence, 
including expert evidence, is admitted, there may be no foundation for the 
judicial directions designed to foster full consideration.128 As we examine 
next, that evidence must be made available, and must be seen as a platform 
for imagining what it is really like to live in circumstances of ongoing family 
violence. This highlights the challenge to which we now turn: the barriers to 
understanding the experience of ‘others’. 
IV  R E C O G N I S I N G  A N D  R E SP O N D I N G  T O  T H E  EX P E R I E N C E  O F  
‘OT H E R S’ :  ABU SE D  WO M E N  WH O  KI L L  A N D   
‘ I N F O R M E D  IM AG I N I N G ’  
Even where there is a legislative direction to give particular attention to the 
lived experience of ‘others’, a problem of recognising and responding to 
difference remains. This prompts us to ask, why do ‘we’ have such trouble 
understanding the experience of ‘others’? To a large extent, the answer is 
contained in the question itself. The ‘we’ here is not the ‘other.’ Insofar as a 
legislator, judicial officer or juror is a member of one (or more) of these 
groups, they will share a common experience and not need to reach across an 
experiential divide to understand the other. They are the ‘other’. However, 
such individuals are likely to be the minority. The challenge for most of us, 
therefore, is to understand the experience of others with whom we do not 
share a common ‘social category’. 
 
 128 For a case-specific example and discussion of the relevance and impact of expert evidence 
relating to family violence and self-defence in a murder trial, see Charlotte King et al, ‘Did 
Defensive Homicide in Victoria Provide a Safety Net for Battered Women Who Kill? A Case 
Study Analysis’ (2016) 42 Monash University Law Review 138, 155–60. 
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As humans, we are socialised to see the world from a particular perspec-
tive and from the confines of social categories. The human mind cannot think 
without the aid of categories.129 Categories are essential to survival and to 
linguistic and social engagement in the world. Indeed, ‘[t]he distinction 
between the inside and the outside … which is absolutely fundamental to law’ 
is itself a function of the categorical thinking inherent in our engagement 
with the physical and social world.130 These categories extend not just to 
objects in the world but to categories of people. As Plous states, ‘[s]ocial 
categories form an indispensable part of human thought’.131 He cites research 
on gender recognition, which establishes that ‘children typically form social 
categories within the first year of life’ and are, for example, ‘often able to 
discriminate between female and male faces by the age of 9 months, and 
sometimes as early as 5 months’.132 Returning to our siblings, Jane and Tom, 
this means that each will quickly learn to discriminate male from female. 
They will come to understand that they fit into one or the other category, and 
then begin a process of receiving social and cultural signals about what it 
means to be male or female. According to Barrett, ‘[t]he process begins at 
birth, … infants are subjected to a barrage of cultural influences that are 
designed to make them think, act and feel like the adult member of  
the society’.133 
As explained by Easteal, this process then acts to obscure our efforts to 
understand the experience of others.134 She uses a kaleidoscope metaphor to 
explain how our enculturation comes to filter the way we perceive reality: ‘our 
perception is the outcome of our own individual experiences and knowledge 
which blends to produce “filters” or mirrors that create or reflect or distort a 
picture at the end of the kaleidoscope cylinder’.135 
The process is inexorable, subtle and complicated by the intersecting na-
ture of our experience. This means that we come to see ourselves and others 
 
 129 Gordon W Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1954) 20. 
 130 Davies (n 40) 14. 
 131 Plous (n 45) 7. 
 132 Ibid 25, citing Mary Driver Leinbach and Beverly I Fagot, ‘Categorical Habituation to Male 
and Female Faces: Gender Schematic Processing in Infancy’ (1993) 16 Infant Behaviour and 
Development 317. 
 133 Richard A Barrett, Culture and Conduct: An Excursion in Cultural Anthropology (Wadsworth 
Publishing, 1984) 54, 64. See also Easteal, Less than Equal (n 26) 2. 
 134 Easteal, Less than Equal (n 26) 1–3. 
 135 Ibid 1–2. 
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in terms of intersecting social, racial, political, national, economic and sexual 
categories, to name just a few. 
Regardless of the lenses we are looking through, the fundamental point, as 
Bartlett states, is that truth is both situated and partial: situated because ‘it 
emerges from particular involvements and relationships’, and partial because 
‘individual perspectives that yield and judge truth are necessarily incom-
plete’.136 In short, the way we perceive reality, and the reality of others, is a 
function of our limited experience. 
It is not simply the lenses of our experience that undermine or distort our 
efforts to understand the experience of others. It is the fact that we are often 
not aware that we are looking through ‘kaleidoscopes in the first place’.137 This 
means that we assume that the view through our lenses provides an image of 
the truth, rather than an image mediated by the lenses. Through a process of 
cultural amnesia, we forget that our ‘thoughts, behaviours and way of looking 
at the world were learned’, and learned in our particular context. We begin 
therefore to think in terms of natural and normal (our way) and unnatural 
and abnormal (others).138 
Bringing the focus back to equality, MacKinnon’s point — that ‘[t]hose 
who most need equal treatment will be the least similar, socially, to those 
whose situations set the standard against which one’s entitlement to be 
equally treated is measured’ — can also be understood in kaleidoscopic 
terms.139 By and large, the lenses of legislators, judicial officers and legal 
practitioners (and jurors) are so different to those of abused women that their 
reality, as ‘other’ is all but obscured. And, significantly, while this obfuscation 
may work both ways, in the context of ‘according’ equal justice, it is the view 
of the criminal justice decision-maker that defines the legal terrain and 
determines the outcome. The distribution of power, and responsibility for its 
exercise, never leaves the frame.140 To ‘accord’ implies there is an institution 
or person in a position to grant or withhold equality. This takes on emotive 
and practical content if we envisage the granter as, for example, a well-
educated, male judge from a privileged background directing a jury on the 
application of the law of self-defence in the trial of an abused woman who has 
killed her violent partner. 
 
 136 Bartlett (n 39) 880–1. 
 137 Easteal, Less than Equal (n 26) 2. A similar point is made in relation to the invisibility of 
whiteness and the study of whiteness, see, eg, Davies (n 40) 310–16. 
 138 Easteal, Less than Equal (n 26) 2. 
 139 MacKinnon (n 24) 44 (citations omitted). 
 140 Ibid. 
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But the challenge of understanding is not insurmountable. The experien-
tial divide can be bridged. What follows is a general discussion of a standpoint 
for, and approaches to, engaging with the experience of others. Herein we 
develop the notion of ‘informed imagining’. 
A  Bridging the Divide: ‘Informed Imagining’ 
Reaching across the experiential divide in pursuit of equality requires us to 
understand the bounded nature of our own experience and actively seek to 
engage with the experience of others. It places an ethical obligation upon us to 
acknowledge the barriers to understanding and act positively to surmount 
them. Engaging with the experience of others starts with a realistic apprecia-
tion of the extent to which each of us — including, critically, legislators, 
judges, magistrates, legal practitioners and jurors — have been socialised to 
see the world from a situated and limited perspective that obscures the reality 
of others whose experiences we do not share. 
Extending our perspective to engage with and understand the perspective 
of others requires a combination of information and imagination, conceptual-
ised here as ‘informed imagining’. Bartlett’s description of this as a process of 
‘stretching’ our imagination is apt because extending our perspective to 
engage with the experience of others requires conscious effort.141 
Appealing once again to intuition, there is something powerful in asking 
the question, ‘How would I feel if this were done to me?’ This question is a 
reflection of what has been termed the ‘Golden Rule’;142 that is, the principle 
that we should do unto others as we would have them do to us. This is a 
principle of moral action based in reciprocity ‘found in some form in almost 
every ethical tradition’.143 It requires us to imagine what it would be like to be 
in the shoes of others. The fact that asking such questions of ourselves has the 
capacity to shift our deeply held beliefs about others, facilitating an empathic 
engagement, has been established by psychological research.144 Plous main-
tains, in the context of addressing prejudice, stereotyping and discrimination, 
that in order ‘[t]o become more empathic toward the targets of prejudice, all 
one needs to do is to consider questions such as How would I feel in that 
 
 141 Bartlett (n 39) 882. 
 142 Simon Blackburn, Ethics: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2001) 101. 
 143 Ibid. 
 144 Plous (n 45) 36. 
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situation?, How are they feeling right now?, or Why are they behaving  
that way?’145 
Shifting from psychology to philosophy, we note the use of imagination as 
a device for achieving justice receives concrete and detailed formulation by 
Rawls in A Theory of Justice. The ‘original position’ therein described is a 
thought experiment, ‘a purely hypothetical situation characterised so as to 
lead to a certain conception of justice’.146 The central idea is that principles of 
distributive justice are those chosen by equals from behind a veil of igno-
rance. Those behind the veil do not know their place in society, their ‘class 
position’, ‘social status’, ‘natural assets and abilities’ and so forth.147 Thus, they 
must choose principles that will be fair, no matter what their place may in fact 
be. This necessarily requires them to imagine that they are one of the ‘least 
advantaged members of society’.148 
Okin strongly critiques Rawls’s failure to engage with gender, and with  
the family as a social institution to which principles of justice must be 
applied.149 Nonetheless she recognises the radical potential inherent in the 
original position: 
The significance of Rawls’s central, brilliant idea, the original position, is that it 
forces one to question and consider traditions, customs, and institutions from 
all points of view, and ensures that the principles of justice are acceptable to 
everyone, regardless of what position ‘he’ ends up in.150 
 
 145 Ibid (emphasis in original). 
 146 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Belknap Press, 1971) 12. 
 147 Ibid 12; see also at 137. However, Okin notes that ‘sex’ does not receive a mention in the ‘list 
of things unknown by a person in the original position’: Susan Moller Okin, ‘John Rawls: 
Justice as Fairness — For Whom?’ in John Perry and Michael Bratman (eds), Introduction to 
Philosophy: Classical and Contemporary Readings (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 1993)  
680, 681. 
 148 Rawls (n 146) 15. That this is required is evident from the principles that Rawls says will 
emerge. For example, ‘inequalities of wealth and authority, are just only if they result in  
compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of 
society’: 14–15. 
 149 Okin (n 147) 680–6. 
 150 Ibid 686. Cornell maintains that feminists ‘should find an ally in Rawls’: Cornell (n 40) 13. 
Drawing upon Rawls, she argues for an ‘imaginary domain’ as a place of ‘prior equivalent 
evaluation that must be imagined no matter what historical and anthropological researchers 
tell us is “true” about women’s nature’ and stating that ‘[t]he moral demand lies at the heart 
of the hypothetical situation of the imagination, and it is out of this hypothetical situation 
that a fair proceduralist conception of justice can be developed’: at 15–16. 
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However, the idea that we may enter a decontextualised ‘original position’ 
suggests, contrary to the enculturation thesis, that we can ‘transcend’ our 
perspective. As has been argued above, this cannot in fact be done, or at least 
not completely. The trap, which Okin suggests Rawls falls into, is that a male 
perspective, for example, may be claimed to constitute the decontextualised 
perspective.151 This limitation does not undermine the importance of imagin-
ing ourselves into the shoes of others in pursuit of justice, but it does require 
us to be reflective about the process. Further, acknowledging the limits of our 
ability to decontextualise ourselves highlights other problems with imagining, 
being the limits of our ability to recontextualise ourselves into the shoes  
of others. Again, this does not devalue imagination as a device for under-
standing the lived experience of others and thereby facilitating the realisation  
of equality. But it does require us to understand this as a real position-
al challenge. 
The point here is that we cannot usefully imagine what it would be like to 
be in another’s shoes without information about their experience and the 
experience of the relevant group to which they belong. The effort to give 
‘equal consideration’ is furthered by the feminist method of ‘consciousness 
raising’ or ‘making known the unknown’.152 
We are particularly concerned with targeted consciousness raising. At issue 
are strategies for making the unknown known for criminal justice decision-
makers so they can engage with the reality of abused women who kill. Even 
with an enabling legislative foundation, this requires effort, information and 
imagination. It is an active process of engaging with information (or evidence) 
about a woman’s experience, the experience of abused women generally and 
the dynamics of family violence, and then imagining ‘what it must really be 
like to live in a situation of ongoing violence’.153 It is only through ‘informed 
imagining’ that we can gain a full appreciation of the ‘extraordinary circum-
stances’ that that woman faced. And it is only from this position that the 
reasonableness or otherwise of her actions becomes intelligible. 
 
 151 Okin (n 147) 688. 
 152 Patricia A Cain, ‘Feminism and the Limits of Equality’ (1990) 24 Georgia Law Review 803. It 
is not suggested that consciousness-raising is not a strategy adopted by other emancipatory 
movements; undoubtedly, it must be. However, use of the term here is based on its well-
recognised place in feminist thought. 
 153 Rebecca Bradfield, Submission No 17 to Victorian Law Reform Commission, Defences to 
Homicide (13 December 2003), quoted in Victorian Law Reform Commission, Defences to 
Homicide (Final Report, 1 August 2004) 135 [4.18]. 
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This challenge starts with an acknowledgement that ‘an abused woman’s 
experiences are generally outside the common understanding of the average 
judge and juror’.154 This is not the man faced with a ‘one-off physical attack’ 
who claims he killed in self-defence. His actions can be readily understood — 
he is the norm, the person against whom other claims of reasonableness are 
measured. And so, the average judge and juror needs to learn what it is really 
like to live under the constant shadow of abuse. To understand why, for 
example, the woman could not ‘just leave’.155 Thus, the promise of equal 
consideration, even if enabled by the substantive law, remains but a prom-
ise without a careful, evidence-based rendering of the abused woman’s  
real predicament. 
This is where contextual and expert evidence comes to the fore. As dis-
cussed, the Victorian reforms contained in ss 322M and 322J of the Crimes 
Act 1958 (Vic) go furthest towards facilitating this flow of information about 
the experience of abused women who kill. However, although the specific 
inclusion of a direction regarding ‘evidence of family violence’ itself has a 
consciousness-raising potential, the sections are largely facilitative: they 
merely provide an opportunity for ‘informed imagining’. The task of raising 
the consciousness of the jurors falls to defence lawyers (and judges). Unless 
they are conscious of the reality of family violence and how this may affect the 
presentation of their client and their capacity to tell their story, there is no 
prospect that the court will be informed of this reality. 
V  CO N C LU SI O N :  T H E  P O T E N T IA L  O F  EQUA L  CO N S I DE R AT IO N 
We have argued that a foundation that enables the pursuit of equality before 
the law is the inherent equality and value of all human beings and the 
corresponding entitlement to equal respect, equal concern and equal consid-
eration. We have focused on the last as representative of these various 
formulations, contending that a principle of equal consideration best enables 
answers to be given to equality questions because of its capacity to focus our 
attention on the need to take relevant differences into account, and engage 
with the different experiences of others. This requires us to acknowledge the 
limitations of our own socially constructed perspective and the barrier this 
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presents to understanding the experiences of those who differ markedly  
from us. 
Using self-defence as a case study, we have argued that the structure of the 
law and reforms in England/Wales and Queensland do not provide equal 
consideration for abused women. In England/Wales, this failure transpires 
most evidently due to reforms which allow disproportionate force to be used 
in burglary cases, but not in cases involving violent partners. In relation to 
Queensland, a similar trajectory can be seen: again reforms have focused 
upon producing a new partial defence as opposed to opening up self-defence 
to abused women. In contrast, we have argued that the legislature in Victoria 
has endeavoured to institute reforms that recognise and respond to the lived 
reality of women who kill their abusers. 
We conclude that answering an equality question requires a close contex-
tual focus on the lived experience of those who come before the law. Entailed 
in an entitlement to equal consideration is the necessity for those who have the 
capacity to promote equality before the law to actively work to ‘stretch’ their 
perspective to recognise and respond to others — a process that requires 
information, imagination and effort. Further, insofar as according equality is 
concerned, the more distant the decision-maker, be they legislator, judicial 
officer or juror, in terms of their own experience as compared to the experi-
ence of the ‘other’ under consideration, the greater the level of information, 
imagination and effort required. Though not discussed here, it is noted that 
there could be significant variations to the extent that individuals are psycho-
logically capable of empathising with and understanding others, and thereby 
crossing the experiential divide. However, from whatever original disposi-
tional point one begins with, it is suggested that recognising and responding 
to the different experience of others is a human capacity and one that can be 
actively promoted. 
The upshot is that the pursuit of equality before the law is an unending 
task that requires us to repeatedly ask of ourselves, ‘What would it be like to 
be in the shoes of others?’, whilst acknowledging the limitation of our capacity 
to do so. But in doing this, we should notice that something exciting happens. 
Our perception sharpens and extends beyond the location of analysis. We 
become open to the broad and ongoing equality conversation. Bringing the 
iceberg metaphor to bear in the contexts considered in this article, the point 
can be explained as follows: when we engage with the lived experience of 
abused women who have killed their violent partners, the iceberg of male 
violence and domination of women is revealed, together with the resultant 
power differentials. Equality in the application of the law of self-defence is 
seen for what it is, part of a much larger goal of gender equality. 
